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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\.ElL\ T. CALLISTER, 
Plaintiff-R e.Y ponde nt, 
vs. 
LrCY t'. CALLISTER, individually 
and as Executrix of the Estate of 
Alfred Cyril Callister, deceased, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 
10013 
PETITION FOR REHE.ARING AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully moves the court 
lor a rehearing in the above entitled case. 
The rehearing should be granted for the following 
reasons: 
1. The court mistook the nature of the proceedings 
from which this appeal wast aken. 
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2. The decision creates doubt as to future proce-
dures in the trial court: 
... 3. The decision overlooks i1nportant provisions of 
the probate code as adopted by the Utah Legislature. 
4. The fiduciary relationship between Lucy and 
Vera, if it ever existed, ended prior to negotiation of 
the settlement agreement. 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
I. 
THE COURT lVIISTOOK THE NATURE 
OF . T H E PROCEEDINGS FROM \YHICH 
THIS APPEAL WAS TAKEN. 
Inasmuch as affirmance of the trial court's decision 
is grounded, at least in part, upon the proposition that 
"a probate judge 1nust be allowed smne discretion in 
supervising its officers," it is fair to conclude that the 
court regarded this case as one involving the plenary 
power of a probate judge. 
Actually, no probate judge as such was involved in 
the P.roceeding b~low. The original action to set aside 
the transfers to Lucy was a garden-variety civil action 
in which v· era was plaintiff and Lucy was defendant. 
Moreover, it was merest coincidence that Judge Ellett, 
the pretrial judge in CiYil No. 133656, heard the mo-
tions for summary judg1nent in Civil No. 145149. 
· If Vera had proceeded under Rule 60 (b) Utah 
Rules of CiYil Procedure-which, according to Rule 
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T 
It 
(. 
tH (b), applies to proba tc n1atters after joinder of issue 
--it would have been dift'erent, but Rule 60 (b) was not 
all availuhle a ,·cnue of relief because ( 1) Vera waited 
too long, and ( 2) she sought relief frmn something in 
addition to a "final judgment, order, or proceeding," 
vi7.., a duly executed and aeknowledged absolute release 
of Yera 's clain1s against Lucy as an individual or as 
cxceutrix. 
Uule 60 (b) provides, in part, as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court n1ay in the furtherance of justice re· 
lieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgn1ent, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: * * * ( 3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an ad· 
rcrsc party * * *. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(:.?) , ( 3) , or ( 4) not tnore than three months 
after the judgtnent, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. * * * The procedure for obtain· 
ing a uy relief from a judgment shall be by mo· 
tion as prescribed by these rules or by an inde-
pendent action." 
The rule was based upon Federal Rule 60 (b), 
except that the three-month period was taken fro1n a 
prior Ctah statute, 104-14-.J. Utah Code Annotated 
194o3. The earlier statute and Rule 60 (b) regulate and 
restrict the plenary power of a court to act upon its 
own judgn1ents. See In rc Goddard,s Estate, 73 Utah 
:?98. :!7a P.2d 961. If Rule 60 (b) had been in the case, 
''judicial discretion" would haYe been. See 7 Moore;s 
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Federal Practice, para. 60.19, p. 223, commenting on 
Federal Rule 60 (b): 
''If the district court has the power to grant 
relief, then its discretion to grant or deny relief 
norinally involves a discretionary appraisal of 
the facts of the particular case and the relief, if 
any, to be granted: this n1atter, then, is largely 
within the judicial discretion of the trial court." 
But this could not have been a proceeding under 
Rule 60 (b). See Shaw v. Pilcher~ 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 
P.2d 949, in which the court, speaking through Justice 
H;enriod, said: 
· "Pilchers attack the whole proceeding as being 
violative of Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, with its three-month limitations fea-
ture relating to entertaining motions for relief 
because of mistake, newly discovered eYidence 
and the like. A reading of the rule makes it ap-
parent that a motion for relief based on the 
grounds_enumerated therein is ineffective if made 
three months after the decision in which relief 
is sought. The proceeding here, although cap-
tioned a 'petition' was in fact a motion made in 
the original action, and was primarily on an alle-
gation of 'fraud upon the court.' 'Ve believe in 
whole that where 'fraud upon the court' is the 
gravamen of the proceeding, such proceeding 
must be pursued in an independent action by fil-
ing a separate suit, paying the statutory filing 
fee therefor ('which was not done here), and the 
statutory issuance and service of process." 
Counsel for respondent had originally recognized 
that Rule 60 (b) relief was not available. An inde-
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pendent action was initiated by a c01nplaint filed on 
August :!.7, 1 Hti:J; a new filing fee was paid; a sununons 
wus issued; and process was served. :\lotions for sunl-
mary judgtnent were n1ade, and the question before 
this court was not whether the trial court properly exer-
cised its discretion, but 'll'hcther there was any r1enuine 
i.~t.vuc mt to any material fact (Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure) . 
II. 
THE DECISION CREATES DOUBT AS 
TO .FlrTlTHE PltOCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
In its decision the court quoted language used by 
Judge Ellett at the hearing of the motions for summary 
judgment. but it apparently overlooked some of the 
languaa-e in the judgment itself: 
"The stipulation for dismissal and the judg-
Inent of disn1issal in Ch·il No. 133656, and the 
release executed by Yera T. Callister on October 
10, 1962, are hereby set aside, annulled, and va-
t'a ted, and Civil Action No. 133656 is hereby 
consolidated with the above entitled action, Civil 
No. 145149." 
The a hove language purports to decide the whole 
controversy with respect to the enforceability of the 
comprmuise and settlement; yet this court's decision 
suggests that some of the equitable defenses may yet be 
alive: 
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"Does [the Beless) letter suggest a settlement 
to perhaps promote the misleading of the tax 
authorities '1 Is 'r era the culprit and Lucy the 
misled? 11he letter is unquestionably capable of 
such an interpretationJ but it is also capable of 
being interpreted as a plea for Lucy to abandon 
an erroneous position for her own good. The 
court below has not finally ruled on the sugges-
tion that VeraJs ~hands are uncleanJ and should 
not have the aid of the court. This iss·ue may well 
yet be tried. But regardless of the determination 
of that matter, it does not indicate the court below 
erred in rejecting Lucy's conduct as unworthy 
of approval, and not desired in the public in-
test. After the co·urt below determines the facts 
in dispute J such as the intent of the doctor, the 
good faith of 'T era's counsel in writing the letter, 
and other contests that may developJ then jus-
tice and eq,nity will be dealt between them." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is universally recognized that an action to set 
aside a judgment is an equitable action and is subject 
to equitable defenses. Defendant-Appellant has raised 
equitable defenses which should be presented for con-
sideration by a fact finder (whether court or judge) as 
fact finder - not as judicial administrator exercising 
discretion to control "court officers" for misconduct in 
some prior term. 
In cases such as this, where the claimed misconduct 
occurred, if at all, months before relief was sought, full 
hearing. and due deliberation appear to be n1ore desir-
able than to dispatch. Nothing .is likely to happen to 
a court's ability to maintain respect pending a trial of 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the issue:~ .. \s written, the decision permits a trial court 
to depri,·e a litigant of valuable property rights without 
u trial or hearing of any kind and in a situation in 
which a need for speed is not apparent. 
III. 
TIIE DECISIOX 0\'ERLOOKS I~IPOR­
'L\~T PUOVISIONS OF THE PROBATE 
CODE AS .ADOPTED BY. THE UTAH LEGIS-
1,,\'fURE. 
The probate code recognizes the difference between 
the obligations of a personal representative with respect 
to assets ''belonging to the estate" and assets transferred 
by the decedent (even if wrongfully) prior to his death . 
. \s pointed out in 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice (2d 
eel.) §47 4, an obligation of a personal representative 
to pursue assets which had been fraudulently conveyed 
is strictly statutory. It didn't exist in common law be-
cause the personal representative was in the same posi-
tion as the decedent, and one who transfers property 
in fraud of creditors cannot get it back. 
A l;tah personal representative has no obligation 
to recover fraudulently conYeyed assets except upon 
application of creditors who will agree to pay costs of 
the suit or put up such security as may be ordered by 
the court (75-11-14 Utah Code Annotated 1953). No 
application of this sort was eYer made by y· era. 
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Inasmuch as Lucy had no duty to Vera until the 
proper application had been made, she could not have 
been a fiduciary. Moreover, the suggestion that Lucy 
"should have resigned" seetus to place a disability upon 
the fiduciary rather than protect the beneficiary from 
possible tnisconduct by the fiduciary. If Lucy had re-
signed, 'r era's position would not have been helped; she 
wouldn't have acted any differently, and she wouldn't 
have been entitled to get any information fron1 Lucy. 
Neither would the new personal representative. Her 
position would have been exactly the same. Duties of 
fiduciaries should be detertnined on the basis of causa] 
relationships, rather than upon purely formal ones 
which have nothing to do with Inotivatiuns upon which 
parties act. 
The court's suggestion that Lucy should not have 
undertaken to act as executrix or that she should have 
resigned is in contravention of the declared policy of 
the Legislature. Under the provisions of 75-4-1 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 those persons having the most 
direct interest in the property of a decedent are the ones 
who are preferred to act as administrators. This is as it 
should be, for if the interested person cannot act, who 
would? The fact that there 1nay be conflicts of interest 
between the executor and the other heirs or creditors 
did not concern the Legislature. Where the conflict of 
interest prevents a personal representative f1·mn proper-
ly performing his duties, other interested persons can 
have him removed. Far·nsworth v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 
151 Pac. 537. 
10 
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So1ne eourts have en·n rejected the view that the 
adverse interest of the fiduciary is ground for removal. 
ln Jl'r.11 t'. Fr,tJ. 1.>.> Iowa~;)-!<, 1:3;) N.l\r.l095, in which 
remond of an ~uln1inistratrix was sought on the ground 
that she was clairning all of the assets alleged to belong 
to the estate were hers under a prior gift by the decedent, 
the court said: 
"It is true that the adrninistratrix is claiming 
practically all of the estate after the payment of 
debts, funeral and other expenses, including 
nwnun1ent and burial lots; but her claims have 
been open and above board and she has asserted 
thern in a proper 1nanner, both by petition to the 
eourt in which she 1nade plaintiff herein a party, 
and by application for the appointment of a spe-
cial adtninistrator to pass upon her claims as is 
authorized by §3346 of the Code. True, her 
clai1ns are in hostility to the interest which plain-
tiff is clai1ning as father to the decedent, but no 
nwre so than any other claim against the estate 
would be. Defendant can take nothing without 
an order of the court} and has no advantage over 
t!tt plaintiff in ·cirtue of her appointment as ad-
ministratrit~'. '·' (Ernphasis added.) 
In the instant case Lucy had no advantage over 
\"era by ,·irtue of her appointment as the executrix. 
IV. 
THE FIDlTCIARl~ RELATIONSHIP BE-
T\YEEX LlTcy· AXD '7"ERA, IF IT EY"ER 
EXI~TED. EXDED PRIOR TO NEGOTIA-
TIOX OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREE-
)IEXT. 
11 
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The cases cited under Point I of Appellant's Brief 
and Point III of the Appellant's Reply Brief indicate 
that when the parties choose to deal with each other at 
arm's length, notwithstanding the fiduciary relation-
ship, they should be treated like any other parties. See 
Collins v. Collins~ 48 Cal.2d 325, 309 P.2d 420; 1Vadd;lJ 
v. Grimes~ 154 Va. 615, 153 S.E. 807; and In re Blod-
getfs Estate, 93 Utah 1, 70 P.2d 742 (in which the 
holding supports Lucy's position); Pepper v. Litton, 
308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281; Western 
Grain Company Cases~ 264 Ala. 145, 85 So.2d 395. 
CONCLUSION 
If this case had been treated as an independent 
action to set aside a judgment, as it should have been, 
Vera would have had the burden of establishing 
gr.ounds for intervention of a court of equity-of show-
ing that she, not a prior term's probate or trial judge, 
is entitled to relief. She would have to establish that 
she was wrongfully induced to enter into a compromise 
and settlement agreement; and Lucy would have had 
the right to show that Vera's own conduct precludes 
equitable relief. 
But the court's mistaken assumption that the case 
involved a trial or probate court's plenary power over 
its own judgments apparently led it to the conclusion 
that the n1yriads of cases that have dealt with contracts, 
lawsuits and settlements between fiduciaries and their 
beneficiaries had no bearing upon the validity of the 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trinlt·ourt's adion, since the inquiry, under the theory 
adopted by the court, was whether it had abused its 
dist'l'etion. The cited eases are not controlling upon 
tht.· question of whether a court has abused its discretion 
i11 t.•xcrTising its plenary power. but they are indisput-
ably relevant to an independent action to set aside a 
stipulation, j udgtnent, and release. 
Conferring upon a trial judge the power to vacate 
judgments long after the~· are entered, without a hear-
ing, merely because tnisconduct of a "court officer" is 
asserted. has ituplications far beyond future conduct 
of personal representati,·es. Attorneys are also officers 
of the court. and their adi,·ities are involved in virtually 
l'Ver~· j udgtnent entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
F~bian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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